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Why rights are not optimisation requirements
Aleardo Zanghellini
School of Law, University of Reading, Reading, UK
ABSTRACT
In this article I pursue the implications of the statement that
constitutional rights are – as Alexy’s principles theory argues –
optimisation requirements, and show that they are not. I argue
that, applied to moral rights, optimisation obfuscates their nature,
their relationship to human well-being, and the work they do in
practical thought. As to constitutional rights, the fact that they
belong in an institutional framework suggests some reasons for
treating them like optimisation requirements in circumscribed
cases. But these reasons are far from conclusive; and treating
rights like optimisation requirements in other scenarios (such as
cases of structural discretion) indicates that optimisation, as
deﬁned in the principles theory, does not assist us in thinking well
about the structure of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights
demand compliance with whatever the interests on which they
are based demand – whether or not what they demand is







In this article I pursue the implications of the statement that constitutional rights are – as
Alexy’s inﬂuential theory argues – optimisation requirements, and show that they are not.
Alexy’s theory originated as a reconstruction of German constitutional rights practice.
Nonetheless, Alexy has always conceded that this reconstruction incorporated a general
theory of constitutional rights to the extent that the latter concerns itself with ‘the necess-
ary structure of constitutional rights’.1 Furthermore, it was argued early on that ‘his theory
is applicable more widely’,2 and Alexy’s view on rights now informs a prominent strand of
contemporary constitutional theory across diﬀerent jurisdictions.3 Thus, it is both impor-
tant and timely to consider to what extent Alexy’s conception of rights as optimisation
requirements provides a sound account of the ‘necessary structure of constitutional rights’.
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1Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers trans, OUP 2002) 6. See also Kai Möller, ‘Balancing and the
Structure of Constitutional Rights’ (2007) 5 ICON 453.
2Julian Rivers, ‘A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution’ in Robert Alexy (ed), A Theory of Constitutional
Rights (Julian Rivers trans, OUP 2002) xvii, xviii.
3Matthias Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ (2004) 2 ICON
574, 575; Jan Henrik Klement, ‘Common Law Thinking in German Jurisprudence: On Alexy’s Principles Theory’ in Matthia
Klatt (ed), Institutionalised Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (OUP 2012) 173; Francesco J Urbina, A Critique of
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I start by clarifying that in targeting the statement that rights are optimisation require-
ments, my critique in this article takes issue with Alexy’s theory only to the extent that it
purports to inform us about the nature or structure of rights. I do not question the limb of
the principles theory that concerns itself with the method to resolve conﬂicts involving
rights, namely, proportionality. While Alexy argues that conceiving of rights as optimis-
ation requirements implies a commitment to proportionality, I deny this is the case: we
can, and should, prise optimisation oﬀ proportionality in Alexy’s theory, for a commit-
ment to the idea of optimisation distorts proportionality analysis – that is, it distorts
the process through which conﬂicts between rights, or between them and other interests,
are resolved. The rest of the paper is devoted primarily to showing why this is so. It begins
by testing the veracity of the statement that rights are optimisation requirements when it is
applied, mutatis mutandis, to moral rights. My argument is that it obfuscates, rather than
clariﬁes, their nature, their relationship to human well-being, and the work they do in
practical thought. I go on to test the veracity of the statement when applied to consti-
tutional rights. I argue that at ﬁrst blush there may be reasons for treating constitutional
rights like optimisation requirements in the case of coercive paternalistic interference, or
cases that can be assimilated to it. But these reasons are far from conclusive; and treating
rights like optimisation requirements in other scenarios – involving conﬂicts of rights and
structural discretion – indicates that there are better ways of making sense of the nature or
structure of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights are best understood as demanding
compliance – within the factual and legal possibilities – with whatever the interests in
which they are grounded require, whether or not the content of those requirements is
antecedently clear; not with some purported imperative to realise their object to the great-
est extent possible. It will be clear from this argument that I take Raz’s conceptualisation of
rights (as grounding duties in the interests of other people) as the most successful account
of the nature of all rights.4
Rights as optimisation requirements and proportionality
In denying that rights are optimisation requirements, I am not interested in questioning
proportionality as a method of resolving conﬂicts between rights or between rights and
other interests. This may seem odd, as Alexy claims that the nature of rights as optimis-
ation requirements implies the necessity of proportionality analysis and vice-versa, and
that he considers the claim that rights are optimisation requirements equivalent to the
claim that rights call for proportionality analysis.5 If Alexy were right on the co-impli-
cation of optimisation and proportionality, in discussing optimisation one must discuss
proportionality, and vice-versa. I argue, however, that Alexy is not right on this point.
Möller has argued that optimisation does not imply proportionality on the basis that
conﬂicts involving optimisation principles can be resolved in ways that do not invoke pro-
portionality in the way Alexy articulates it. For example, Möller argues, some such
conﬂicts should be resolved by appealing to deontological considerations.6 Möller’s
4Joseph Raz, ‘On the Nature of Rights’ (1984) 93 Mind 194.
5Alexy (n 1) xviii–xxix, 66; Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights and Proportionality’ (2014) 22 Revus 51, 52–57; Robert Alexy,
‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 21, 24.
6Möller (n 1) 453, 459.
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argument is contingent on ascribing to proportionality, as articulated by Alexy, a narrow
understanding that excludes deontological reasoning from its purview.
In a 2007 article, Kumm agrees with Möller on the point that the resolution of conﬂicts
involving rights can, but need not always, take the form articulated by Alexy in his account
of proportionality centred on balancing.7 Contrary to Möller, however, Kumm takes
Alexy’s idea of the co-implication of optimisation and proportionality-as-balancing at
face value. Accordingly, Kumm conveys the idea that the resolution of conﬂicts involving
rights can and should take diﬀerent forms by stating that rights are not optimisation
requirements.8 By this he means that when rights prevail over conﬂicting interests it
can, but need not, be as a result of Alexy’s optimisation model of proportionality-as-bal-
ancing. Similarly, Kumm maintains that rights do not necessarily trump conﬂicting inter-
ests, though they do sometimes work like ‘trumps’;9 and that they are not ‘shields’,10
because they do not always work in accordance with the shields model (whereby rights
take priority by default, subject to giving way to particularly powerful conﬂicting
interests).
The key point is that both Kumm and Möller ascribe to proportionality analysis, as
articulated by Alexy, a narrow meaning and conclude that, thus understood, proportion-
ality is only one way of resolving conﬂicts involving rights. The diﬀerence is that while
Möller reaches this conclusion from what he believes is a proper understanding of the
idea that rights are optimisation requirements,11 Kumm ﬁnds that the conclusion is pre-
cluded by the idea of optimisation, and so rejects that idea in the ﬁrst place.12
My own strategy in this article is diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, I take a broader understanding
of Alexy’s articulation of proportionality analysis than Kumm and Möller do. I then sever
my discussion of optimisation from a discussion of proportionality, largely de-problema-
tising the latter (in this section), and foregrounding the former (in the rest of the article).
I think that proportionality analysis, as rendered by Alexy speciﬁcally in terms of bal-
ancing, is not the problem that Kumm and Möller argue it is. Alexy argues that to deter-
mine whether a limitation on a right13 is justiﬁable in accordance with proportionality
analysis, the Law of Balancing should be applied, whereby the greater the limitation on
the right, the greater must be the importance of realising the competing interest (or ‘prin-
ciple’, in Alexy’s terminology).14 He further speciﬁes this law by articulating the so-called
Weight Formula, which takes into account the weights of the competing interests (or, as he
calls them, principles) in the abstract, the intensity of the interference with each, and the
reliability of our predictions about the detriment to each interest if it gives way to the other
in the particular case.15 This quantitative emphasis on weights might lead one to believe
that, on Alexy’s rendition, proportionality analysis rules out ever giving qualitative pre-
cedence to rights over competing considerations, either in accordance with a deontological
7Matthias Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Require-
ment’ in George Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights, Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart 2007) 131, 165.
8ibid.
9Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977).
10Frederick Schauer, ‘A Comment on the Structure of Rights’ (1993) 27 Georgia L Rev 415.
11Kai (n 1) 453, 460, 462.
12Kumm (n 7) 131.
13Assuming the limitation is both suitable and necessary to achieve the realisation of a competing good.
14Alexy (n 5) 51, 54.
15ibid 51, 54–55.
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model (as when rights are treated like trumps), or an ‘excluded reasons’ model (as when
rights are treated like shields), or some other model. But just as Raz’s interest theory of
rights (despite its terminological emphasis on weighing and outweighing) accommodates
cases of rights taking qualitative priority over other considerations,16 so does Alexy’s
account of proportionality. As he explains, cases of excluded reasons (where a competing
interest simply does not qualify as a justiﬁcation for limiting the right) are ‘cases in which
the abstract weight of a principle is zero’, and cases in which rights are treated as absolute
deontological constraints on the pursuit of other goods are ‘cases in which the abstract
weight of a principle is inﬁnite’.17
I do not want to go so far as committing in a deﬁnitive way to the view that the Law of
Balancing and Weight Formula lend themselves to accommodating all conceivable forms
of sound moral reasoning relevant to resolving conﬂicts involving rights. But I believe
Alexy makes a good prima facie case for that proposition. For the purpose of my
present analysis, this suﬃces: thus, I will assume that proportionality analysis lends
itself to helping us resolve conﬂicts involving rights in morally sound ways.
If the ground on which Alexy’s theory has been found wanting by his critics (namely,
the inability of proportionality/balancing to account for deontological and similar con-
siderations) is less solid than Alexy’s critics think,18 it does not follow that the principles
theory is without problems. The problem, as I argue in this article, lies with the optimis-
ation limb of the theory, not with the proportionality limb. The problem, as I see it, is this:
conceiving of rights as optimisation requirements is inconsistent with, and detracts from,
Alexy’s (at least prima facie defensible) account of proportionality. Far from implying pro-
portionality analysis (understood as the correct method of working out relationships
between competing interests in accordance with sound morality, given applicable legal
constraints), the optimisation view is at odds with it. The idea that rights demand realis-
ation of their objects to the greatest extent possible given relevant possibilities (=optimis-
ation) disables sound moral reasoning about rights, for all the reasons the rest of this
article sets out. Thus, realising the potential that proportionality analysis, as rendered
by Alexy, has for assisting us in resolving conﬂicts involving rights in accordance with
sound morality (given applicable legal constraints) is contingent on giving up the view
that rights are optimisation requirements.
Alexy’s claim
‘Key to the entire theory’19 developed by Alexy is the idea that rights, as protected in Con-
stitutions and Bills of Rights, are principles, in the sense of ‘norms which require that
something be realised to the greatest extent possible, given the legal and factual possibili-
ties’.20 Once a right – hitherto an abstract principle enshrined in constitutional docu-
ments, and thereby unrelated to concrete legal and factual possibilities – is related to
such possibilities in a concrete case, and is found to carry the day, then it turns from a
16Aleardo Zanghellini, ‘Raz on Rights: Human Rights, Fundamental Rights and Balancing’ (2017) 30 Ratio Juris 25.
17Alexy (n 5) 51, 59.
18Compare George Pavlakos, ‘A Plea for Moderate Optimisation: On the Structure of Principles as Interpersonal Reasons’ in
Martin Borowski, Stanley L Paulson, and Jan-Reinard Sieckmann (eds), Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrecthstheorie. Robert
Alexys System (Mohr Siebek 2017) 395.
19Rivers (n 2) xvii, xviii.
20Alexy (n 1) 47.
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principle into a rule. On this view, the idea of ‘optimisation’ is built into the very concept
of ‘principle’,21 given Alexy’s own stipulation of what a principle is, which contains the
formula ‘realised to the greatest extent possible’. The key point is that, on this view, con-
stitutional rights require the optimisation of the objects they protect.22
By requiring the optimisation of the objects they protect, rights require their realisation
to the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. In what follows, for
reasons of linguistic economy, I will sometimes replace the expression ‘realisation to the
greatest extent possible’ with ‘maximisation’. Note that maximisation, thus understood,
is not the same as optimisation; rather, optimisation is maximisation (=realisation to
the greatest extent possible) as conditioned by the legal and factual possibilities.
An example can be used to clarify what is meant by legal and factual possibilities in
Alexy’s account. Take the right to freedom of expression. Certain factual possibilities
(the state of technological advancement) necessarily constrained free speech rights to
non-virtual spaces before the invention of the worldwide web and allied technologies.
Now that virtual communication is possible, if governments have a justiﬁable reason
for suppressing certain kinds of speech that circulate through the web, for Alexy they
must ﬁnd the least restrictive means of doing so – avoiding, for example, shutting
down the web in its entirety, or, say, targeting non-problematic kinds of online speech
if these can be disentangled from the problematic ones. All of this is implicit in the idea
of maximisation (of speech) given the factual possibilities.
Legal possibilities, on the other hand, aﬀect the extent to which a right is realised in a
number of diﬀerent ways. Thus, a legal system may limit the maximisation of a right’s
object by giving constitutional protection to competing values, or by failing to provide
for constitutional review, or by limiting the remedies at Courts’ disposal when they ascer-
tain a breach of rights, etc. The ﬁrst of these examples is the most important: ‘Rules aside,
the legal possibilities are determined essentially by opposing principles’.23
The fundamental point is that constitutional rights, for Alexy, demand optimisation,
that is, given these external factual and legal constraints, they call for their objects to be
realised to the greatest extent possible.
The teleology of moral rights: optimisation or equilibrium?
Virtually all mainstream understandings of constitutional and human rights (from which I
exclude critical accounts that view them as tools, say, of disciplinary or class power) share
the view that the point of giving them constitutional protection is to manage certain
relationships between individuals, or between individuals and institutions, or between
individuals and organisations, in accordance with certain requirements of justice.24
21See also Klement (n 3) 173, 180.
22This is the classical formulation and understanding of Alexy’s theory. Alexy later claimed that what is to be optimised is
the right itself, as a principle: Robert Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’ (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 294. As Poscher
incisively argues, however, this move is ill-conceived, misconstruing the object and logic of optimisation: Ralph
Poscher, ‘Theory of a Phantom: The Principles Theory’s Futile Quest for its Object’ in Stanley L Paulson, Alexandre TG
Trivisonno, and Julio Aguar de Oliveira (eds), Alexy’s Theory of Law (Franz Steiner Verlag 2015) 129. Since the only
reason Alexy revised the point was to maintain a distinction between rules and principles that was purely a matter of
theoretical stipulation on his part, we can and should ignore the revision.
23Alexy (n 5) 21.
24Eg, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 2013) 231; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1986) 262; Alexy (n 5) 51, 61.
JURISPRUDENCE 5
Though not all constitutional rights need to be very important, the central case of a con-
stitutional right is that in which this right institutionalises an important moral right. One
may hypothesise that, consequently, the structure of constitutional rights should mirror, at
least broadly, that of the moral rights they institutionalise, and that any divergence should
be accounted for. Alexy himself agrees with this, where he speaks of the ‘existence of
human rights’ (by which he obviously means our important moral rights)25 and of the
‘ideal dimension’ of constitutional rights, which, he argues, ‘lives on’ despite their
nature as positivised human rights.26 As it happens, however, if constitutional rights
are, as Alexy claims, optimisation requirements, then there is a signiﬁcant divergence
between their teleology and that of the moral rights they institutionalise.
The teleology of constitutional rights, on Alexy’s view, is one of optimisation: the right
requires its object to be realised to the greatest extent possible given the factual and legal
constraints it necessarily has to reckon with, which limit the extent to which this
outward, expansive movement can proceed. Moral rights, however, do not work like
that. To appreciate this, let us adapt Alexy’s optimisation view to moral rights. Speciﬁcally,
let us test the hypothesis that moral rights require the maximisation of their objects given
relevant possibilities. Since we are speaking of moral rights, the relevant possibilities here
would be factual possibilities (as with constitutional rights, these are inescapable) as well
as, intuitively, the moral possibilities.27 In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, I will
not, in the main, keep mentioning factual possibilities.
One – not necessarily the most straightforward – way of interpreting the statement that
‘Moral rights require their objects to be realised to the greatest extent possible given the
moral possibilities’ is: ‘Moral rights require their objects to be realised to the greatest
extent possible given the moral possibilities in respect of the requirement to realise it’.
Thus interpreted, the optimisation deﬁnition of moral rights seems true, but is also
unnecessarily redundant. To say ‘Moral rights require their objects to be realised to the
greatest extent possible given the moral possibilities in respect of the requirement to
realise it’ is the same as saying: ‘Moral rights require their objects to be realised to the
extent that it is morally justiﬁed’. Or: ‘The appropriate realisation of moral rights is deter-
mined by relevant moral considerations’. But this is true of any moral norms, so it does not
tell us anything distinctive about the nature of rights. Nor does it really tell us anything
insightful about the nature of moral norms – it is just a tautological restatement of the
moral nature of moral ought-statements.
A more straightforward, non-redundant, interpretation of the statement ‘Moral rights
require their objects to be realised to the greatest extent possible given the moral possibi-
lities’ is: ‘Moral rights require their objects to be realised to the greatest extent possible
given the moral possibilities in respect of their realisation’. But there are several problems
with such an understanding of moral rights. Moral rights justify duties that help towards
(without, generally, guaranteeing)28 the realisation of their objects not to the greatest
extent possible, but only insofar as they do – no less, but also no more. It is entirely
25Robert Alexy, ‘Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights’ (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 2.
26Alexy (n 5) 51, 61.
27In some cases, these considerations may include the need to comply with the law, so that the moral constraints on the
realisation of moral rights may include some of the ‘legal possibilities’ (to use Alexy’s terminology) that constrain the
corresponding constitutional right.
28Raz (n 4) 194, 199.
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possible that the relevant moral possibilities permit the realisation of the object of the right
quite beyond the point at which the right requires it to be realised. Indeed, the moral pos-
sibilities may recommend that the object of the right be realised beyond that point. But the
right itself has nothing to say about that, for rights are one of the grounds for duties (which
are peremptory), not for supererogatory activities (which are voluntary). At most, we
could say that the interest that grounds the duties whose performance the right requires
may justify supererogatory activities not required by the right itself.
To clarify through an example: I am about to drown in strong currents and you happen
to pass by. My moral right to life is a ground for your moral duty to throw me one end of
the rope lying at your feet, in an attempt to help preserve the right’s object (my life). But I
am weak and cannot reach the rope. Factual possibilities (you being there, able-bodied,
and a decent swimmer) permit you to do more, and risk your own life by jumping into
the water to rescue me, thus ‘realising’ the object of my right to a greater extent. The
moral possibilities (resulting from considerations about courage being a virtue, self-
sacriﬁce being morally praise-worthy, and my life being valuable) may even recommend
that you do so. My right to life, however, has nothing to say about that. If my right to life
required the realisation of its object to the greatest extent possible, given only how far it is
factually and morally possible to realise it, people would have unreasonably far-reaching
duties towards me.
Thus, to say that moral rights require the optimisation of their object seems fatuous at
best (ﬁrst interpretation) and absurd at worst (second interpretation). Moral rights require
their objects to be realised no less, but also no more, than relevant moral considerations
require. Such considerations will take into account not only aspects of the well-being of
concrete and abstract others (including those who have duties correlative to my right,
people whose interests happen to conﬂict with mine, as well as future generations), but
also aspects of the well being of the right-holders themselves.
The latter circumstance gives us another reason to doubt the optimisation view (in the
second – the non-redundant – sense I articulated) when applied to moral rights. Rights are
grounded in interests – namely aspects of the right-holders’ well-being,29 and their point is
precisely to serve those interests. It is therefore unlikely that it is in their nature to extend
in directions that fail to promote relevant interests of the right-holder, even if this is wholly
within the bounds of the factually and morally possible. A right, after all, is a ground for
other people’s duties to protect or promote in particular ways that aspect of the right-
holder’s well-being in which the right is grounded; it would, therefore, be odd to hold
other people duty-bound to do (or refrain from doing) something in the name of another’s
well-being, if the required action or omission did nothing to advance it.
Let me illustrate. You saved me from drowning, but I am now lying in bed at the hos-
pital, brain-dead, with no possibility of recovery. I may be made to persist several years in a
painless vegetative state by being drip-fed nutrients via a needle, being kept clean, and
being turned around every couple of hours to prevent pressure sores, until I die a
natural death. The factual and moral possibilities allow for the object of my right to life
to be optimised in this way: there are doctors and nurses and resources enough. Being
kept in a vegetative state will not harm me, but neither will it beneﬁt me. Assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that it is not possible to establish what my preferences might
29ibid 194.
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have been if I anticipated that this might happen to me. It seems counterintuitive here to
say that my interests require that I be kept alive. It seems equally implausible to claim that
they require the opposite – that is, that I be let die.30 Yet, if my right to life requires my life
to be realised to the greatest extent possible given the factual and moral possibilities, then
under the optimisation view we would be forced to conclude that the doctors and nurses
have a moral duty to keep me alive.
Moral rights, well-being and self-interest
Another reason for denying that the teleology of moral rights is one of optimisation hinges
on the distinction between self-interest and well-being. To say that people are rationally
self-interested is to say that they want to maximise their utility, that is, to employ
eﬃcient means to pursue their freely chosen ends.31 If rights – like (many) material
goods – are seen merely as resources at the disposal of rationally self-interested individ-
uals, it may be plausible to speak of moral rights as requiring the maximisation of their
object given relevant possibilities. The problem with this is that such a view of rights
would only make sense in a morally impoverished universe.
Suppose we have a moral right to hold wealth we acquire through work, or that is
bequeathed to us. This moral right will not be absolute – few if any rights are. Assume
that the wealth people acquire is subject to redistributive policies that aim to ensure every-
one a tolerable standard of living, and that these policies are not only morally justiﬁed, but
morally obligatory, in the sense that no or less redistribution would fail to meet the require-
ments of justice. In Alexy’s terms, we would say that there are competing norms (relating
to people being ensured a tolerable standard of living) that limit the realisation of the
object of the right to hold wealth. Now suppose that, were welfare and redistributive pol-
icies more robust, there would be somewhat less wealth overall (because of the disincen-
tivising eﬀect of higher tax rates), but society would turn out to be more cultured and
virtuous in various ways. Suppose, however, that we have no moral right to live in such
a society: though each of us, objectively speaking, has an interest in living in such a
society, with all its advantages, this interest may not be enough to require the government
to take steps to realise it.
In such a scenario, if the government has a duty to maximise the object of our right to
hold wealth given the factual and moral possibilities, it is precluded from increasing tax in
the name of living in a more cultured and virtuous society. Since the government has no
duty to bring about such a society (for by hypothesis we have no right to live in it), it is
morally possible for it to maximise our wealth by not increasing the tax rate with a view
to bringing about such a society. And since it is morally (and, we shall assume, factually)
possible, then the optimisation logic requires that it be done – that the tax status quo be
maintained.
This is a startling conclusion. It seems to only make sense under the stipulation that
moral rights are there to serve people’s self-interest rather than their well-being. Rationally
self-interested actors, as we have seen, seek to maximise their utility – that is, to pursue
30These interests may, of course, require other things – that I be cared for in a way that does not facilitate the onset of
disease, for example.
31Edward L Rubin, ‘Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology’ (1998) Vanderbilt L Rev 1705,
1713–16.
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their goals in eﬃcient ways. On this view, liberty rights are resources: it is in people’s self-
interest to maximise the objects of these rights, as they enable each individual’s pursuit of
what she cares about (be they the pursuit of virtue and culture, or something less lofty).
The right to hold wealth, from this perspective, is a resource whose object must be maxi-
mised given whatever is factually and morally possible in a universe that values self-inter-
est over well-being. In such a universe, the right to hold wealth would preclude the
government from raising tax in the name of a more cultured and virtuous society.
But we might well reach a diﬀerent conclusion if, rather than in self-interest, rights are
grounded in aspects of our well-being,32 where our well-being captures the idea of leading
a successful life.33 If the point of rights is to help us lead successful lives, rather than maxi-
mise our self-interest, our moral right to hold wealth would not be a reason to hold the
government duty-bound not to increase taxes. For our quality of life would be likely to
be higher if we lived in a somewhat less prosperous, but more cultured and virtuous
society. The right may still ground duties not to redistribute wealth beyond a certain
point (we need not pinpoint where), but it would otherwise leave room for the govern-
ment’s pursuit of goals that increase people’s well-being, even in circumstances where
the government has no duty to pursue them.
In a moral universe in which well-being matters (as it should) more than self-interest,
moral rights do not require the maximisation of their objects given the factual and moral
possibilities. They require their objects to be realised no less and no more than the interests
in which the rights are grounded demand, even when it is morally and factually possible to
realise them to a greater extent. When it is morally and factually possible to realise the
object of a right to a greater extent, the right itself does not require such realisation, but
relevant considerations related to human well-being (including the value of the interest
in which any given right is grounded) may or may not recommend that it be realised to
a greater extent, including to the greatest extent possible. On this view, a requirement
to realise the right’s object to the greatest extent possible (given factual and moral possi-
bilities) does not adequately capture the teleology of rights.
My argument here is not that if you think that the optimisation view accurately
describes the nature (not just of constitutional rights, but also) of moral rights, you necess-
arily espouse a view of rights centred on self-interest rather than well-being. It is, rather,
that if you deﬁne rights that way, your deﬁnitional moves are – whether or not you intend
them to be – congenial to the self-interest view, and hence they authorise exercises of prac-
tical reason that are consistent with that view, rather than ones informed by the richer
concept of well-being. Understanding moral rights as optimisation requirements seems
to gesture towards a moral universe where self-interest matters more than well-being.
In a related way, it is also suggestive of a moral universe in which the individual and
society are pitched against each other, echoing the hackneyed picture of individual
rights that communitarian critiques are fond of attacking. Rhetorically, the optimisation
view on moral rights depicts a two-stage process: ﬁrst, there are rights in the abstract,
demanding the fullest realisation of their objects; secondly, there are the factual and
moral possibilities supervening on rights in the real world, curbing their potential for blos-
soming. This makes it look like a loss of value is always necessarily involved – the added
32Raz (n 4) 194.
33Joseph Raz, ‘The Role of Well-Being’ (2004) 18 Philosophical Perspectives 269.
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value the right would have had for the right-holder, if only those external constraints were
not the necessary evil that they are. All this ratiﬁes an unnecessarily conﬂictual view of
morality, in which individual interests and the rights they ground are inevitably or routi-
nely opposed to each other and to those of society.34 But individual interests and the rights
they ground do not emerge in a normative vacuum, and they are not outliers to the rest of
normativity. They belong in the same moral universe as other moral goods, and, like them,
they come into being with inbuilt limitations that are determined by the fact that they
derive their value from their contribution to human life and its quality.35
Those who take an optimisation view on moral rights may well agree with this; presum-
ably, they are convinced that conceiving of rights as requiring the maximisation of their
objects given relevant possibilities assists us precisely in the goal of determining the
extent of each right relative to competing values within this uniﬁed moral universe. But
conceptualising rights as optimisation requirements is just not serviceable to that goal.
This is because for pro-optimisation theorists, as Poscher puts it, rights, ‘in an ideal
world,…would satisfy their unconditional formulations, because they would not have
to be relativized with regard to the legal and factual possibilities’.36 To this extent, the
idea of realisation to the greatest extent possible disables a sound appreciation of the inter-
relationships between rights and other interests. It does so by obscuring the point that, at
least in many cases, the limitations which rights are subject to are part and parcel of the
conditions that make rights valuable, rather than a necessary evil we must put up with in a
non-ideal world.
From moral rights back to constitutional rights: moral constraints
My argument so far is that Alexy’s deﬁnition of rights as optimisation requirements, when
applied, mutatis mutandis, to moral rights, is either redundant, or invites an impoverished
understanding of rights and their place in morality. Speciﬁcally, it obscures both rights’
relationship to well-being, and the distinction between peremptory and non-peremptory
reasons for action. There are, after all, few if any goods whose maximisation given relevant
possibilities is a moral requirement, even when we do have moral rights that have those
goods as their objects, and even when their realisation to the greatest extent possible
may be a very good thing.
An objector might grant all this about moral rights, but argue that this says nothing
about the adequacy of Alexy’s theory. That theory is, the objector will point out, about con-
stitutional rights. These are positivised rights that are part of an institutional framework,
with its own distinctive demands, so that optimisation may be meaningful and useful in
the context of constitutional rights, even if it is not when applied to moral rights. If so,
then a possible disjunction between moral and constitutional rights may always have
been on the cards in Alexy’s theory. In practice, this disjunction would mean that the fol-
lowing two scenarios are always possible. First, the ‘legal possibilities’ that constrain the
realisation of a constitutional right’s object may prevent its realisation to the extent that
the corresponding moral right would require (one need only imagine a competing
34I follow Raz in arguing that they are not: Raz (n 24) 193–216.
35See Raz (n 24) 317–19 (arguing against the view that morality and prudence are normally at odds).
36Poscher (n 22) 129.
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constitutional value that happens to be legally overprotected). Secondly, and conversely,
the constitutional right may require its object to be realised to a greater extent than the
corresponding moral right requires; and even to a greater extent than relevant moral con-
siderations make permissible.
This may sound odd, our objector will concede. Ideally, she will say, the requirements of
constitutional rights would map onto those of corresponding moral rights; but we live in a
non-ideal world, populated by non-ideal decision-makers, and the optimisation frame-
work is supposed to cater for that. On this view, a requirement to optimise the objects
of constitutional rights: (a) relieves judges from some of the hard moral issues that decid-
ing rights cases involves, economising their epistemic resources; and (b) it bolsters their
legitimacy by making their job more transparent and less moralised.37
I will address (a) in the next section. In this section I want to dispute (b), by arguing
that considerations about legitimacy militate in favour, rather than against, aligning as
far as possible our understanding of constitutional and moral rights. One need not be a
natural lawyer to accept this. It is enough to accept that all authorities, even illegitimate
ones, claim legitimacy.38 When it comes, speciﬁcally, to those authoritative directives
consisting in guarantees of constitutional rights, to claim legitimacy is equivalent to
claiming that these rights (or at least many of them) mirror the especially important
moral rights we have, as a matter of justice and sound moral reasoning, vis-à-vis the
State (as well as, at least indirectly, other individuals and organisations). If we take
the possibility of legitimate authority seriously, and if constitutional rights are (as
they must be) central to any political authority’s claim to legitimacy, our understanding
of constitutional rights must therefore make it possible that constitutional rights be
capable of correctly channelling moral requirements into constitutional law. But this
is just what the optimisation theory fails to do in demanding that the object of
rights be maximised given legal and moral possibilities: this requirement disables a sen-
sible use of practical reason on the part of decision-makers adjudicating conﬂicts invol-
ving rights.
Let me illustrate. Suppose a country’s Constitution gives unqualiﬁed protection to the
right to bear arms, and that the wording of its guarantee of the right to life is limited to a
prohibition against the State depriving people of life without due process. Suppose, too,
that this country has a high rate of murders, and that empirical research demonstrates
a strong correlation between it and the general availability of weapons in that country.
Finally, suppose that the interpretive conventions of constitutional judges in this
country are relatively contested. All judges agree that they primarily need to engage
with the constitutional text (rather than, say, unwritten principles), but some judges
favour originalist interpretations, others literal ones, and others still a moralised consti-
tutional hermeneutics. If, as an optimisation requirement, the constitutional right to
bear arms demands that people’s ability to bear arms be realised to the greatest extent poss-
ible given the legal and factual possibilities, then the optimisation view seems biased
towards the status quo and against the introduction of stringent gun laws. For it tells us
that by their very nature (as optimisation requirements) constitutional rights call for
their object’s maximisation given the (factual and) legal possibilities, and the legal
37Thank you to Dimitrios Kyritsis for putting the point so lucidly to me.
38Joseph Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ (2006) 90 Minnesota L Rev 1003, 1005.
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possibilities include literal approaches to the constitutional text, which give the right to
bear arms unqualiﬁed protection (in contrast to the very qualiﬁed protection aﬀorded
to the right to life). This outcome, apparently recommended by the optimisation view,
seems to go against what a sensible use of practical reason would recommend as a
matter of people’s moral rights.
Alexy is, however, a non-positivist – speciﬁcally, an non-positivist of Radbruch’s per-
suasion: he thinks, in other words, that patently unconscionable laws are not genuine
(valid) laws.39 In light of this, Alexy’s account of the nature of constitutional rights
makes room for moral unconscionability as one of the background ‘legal possibilities’
that always condition the maximisation of the objects of constitutional rights. Thus,
on the assumption that it is morally unconscionable to facilitate much unnecessary
loss of life by giving unqualiﬁed protection to the right to bear arms, an understanding
of constitutional rights as optimisation requirements may be able to account for the
imposition of certain limits on this right without forcing on us the conclusion that
such limits necessarily violate the right qua constitutional right that demands the optim-
isation of its object.
Let us assume, then, that this qualiﬁcation is built into the optimisation view: namely,
that the reference to ‘legal possibilities’ always rules out the expansion of a constitutionally
protected right beyond the point when it would be patently unconscionable to protect it.
But since unconscionability sets the bar so high, this still leaves the relevant constitutional
right, potentially, on a course to expand well beyond the point at which the corresponding
moral right would. Ultimately, as the example used illustrates, the extent to which the legal
possibilities that condition the realisation of the objects of constitutional rights (under-
stood as optimisation requirements) incorporate moral limits more stringent than uncon-
scionability would depend on constitutional sources and the interpretive practices and
conventions of relevant decision-making communities. In jurisdictions with constitutional
review, these communities will be primarily constitutional courts. Because canons of con-
stitutional interpretation are often contested, it may not be easy to come to a straightfor-
ward conclusion even within a single jurisdiction. The problem with Alexy’s theory, as I
argue below, is that it biases constitutional interpretive practice towards overprotection of
constitutionally enshrined rights.
Granted that the realisation of the object of a constitutional right is constrained by the
legal possibilities, the maximum level of realisation these possibilities allow for may fall
short of the level of realisation morality (or justice) requires. This does not follow from
Alexy’s deﬁnition of constitutional rights; it is an inevitable consequence of positivising
moral rights into constitutional rights (or it must seem so to all but classical natural
lawyers). Thus, the extent to which such divergence between moral and legal requirements
occurs will be a contingent matter of fact in any given jurisdiction. What is, however,
purely an artefact of the optimisation limb in Alexy’s theory is the reverse scenario: if
(apart from the factual possibilities) all that stands in the way of a constitutional right’s
object being realised as much as possible are the legal possibilities, these (depending on
their content, as established following decision-makers’ interpretive conventions) may
allow the object to be realised:
39Robert Alexy, ‘Some Reﬂections on the Ideal Dimension of Law and on the Legal Philosophy of John Finnis’ (2013) 28 AJJ
97.
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(1) Over and beyond what the corresponding moral right requires (thus creating excessive
burdens on duty-holders);
(2) Over and beyond what supererogatory considerations recommend (thus creating
excessive burdens on duty-holders and failing to serve any useful purpose);
(3) Over and beyond what justice permits, so long as the threshold of Radbruch-type
unconscionability is not reached (thus creating excessive burdens on duty-holders,
failing to serve any useful purpose, and violating moral requirements).
One may legitimately doubt a deﬁnition of constitutional rights that has the potential
for automatically ratifying all these scenarios. Let me be clear here. Mine is not a natural
law argument to the eﬀect that we need to deﬁne constitutional rights in such a way that
allows us to say that morally incorrect instances of balancing (which overprotect rights, as
in (a), (b), and (c) above) are legally invalid. Rather, starting from the point that morally
sound legal balancing of constitutionally protected rights must be central to claims to legit-
imate authority, I argue that our deﬁnition of rights must be such that it is amenable to
that claim to legitimacy. It does not follow that when judges get the balance wrong,
their decisions are not valid law. But a deﬁnition of rights is inept if it demands that we
(and institutional decision-makers) favour balancing outcomes that overprotect rights
when the legal possibilities would be equally compatible with balancing exercises that
do not overprotect them. Yet, this is precisely what the optimisation view demands of
us in its insistence that rights require their objects to be realised to the greatest extent poss-
ible given the factual and legal possibilities. Key to my argument is that the legal possibi-
lities (depending as they do on contingent aspects of individual legal systems) may well
permit more protection of constitutional rights than sound morality demands; and if
they permit it, then the optimisation view requires such overprotection by mandating
the realisation of the right’s object to the greatest extent possible.
Here, the objection might be raised that Alexy claims that optimisation implies propor-
tionality. If this is true, then the legal possibilities that condition the right’s object’s max-
imisation are to be determined, in every constitutional system, in light of a prescription
that a right’s object be realised, other things being equal (that is, to the extent that
other legal possibilities permit), no more than the duties grounded in the right morally
require – an extent determined by proportionality analysis. The problem is that it is not
true that optimisation implies proportionality, much less the reverse (which Alexy also
maintains). To understand ‘legal possibilities’ in light of a prescription that a right’s
object be realised, other things being equal, no more than the duties grounded in the
right morally require, is to replace the concept and logic of optimisation with something else.
It follows that the potential for overprotecting rights that a deﬁnition of constitutional
rights based on optimisation licenses is not forestalled by what Alexy calls the Law of
Competing Principles. This is the idea that, in the light of the concrete circumstances
of a case, we decide, via balancing, on the morally correct scope of any given right vis-
a-vis any opposing norms that condition its realisation to the greatest extent possible,
thus turning the right from an abstract principle oﬀering prima facie protection into a dis-
positive rule oﬀering or denying deﬁnite protection in a particular case.40 The Law of
Competing Principles belongs to the proportionality limb of Alexy’s theory, which, I
40Alexy (n 1) 50–54, 406–08.
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have argued, is independent of, rather than implied by, the optimisation limb. If the Law of
Competing Principles helps avert the scenarios listed above at (1–3), it is only on condition
that it be taken to invalidate the optimisation precept according to which the right’s object
needs to be realised to the greatest extent possible, given only the legal and factual
possibilities.
I suggest, therefore, that we should reject the idea of optimisation as central to our
understanding of constitutional rights, and that we should bring closer our understanding
of constitutional rights with a normatively sound understanding of moral rights. Consti-
tutional rights require their objects to be realised – factual and legal possibilities permitting
– no more and no less than morally demanded by the interests in which the rights are
grounded.
Overprotecting constitutional rights
My argument so far is to the eﬀect that the optimisation view is irrational. Its baseline
(maximisation given relevant possibilities) is arbitrary. Ironically, Alexy’s theory is
intended as an alternative to theories that ‘overprotect [rights] relative to what political
justice requires’;41 yet, given how it is formulated, the optimisation limb of that theory
(if not the proportionality limb) naturally tends towards overprotecting rights in just
that way.
There is no good reason why the realisation of the objects of constitutional rights
should default to the upper limit of what facts and the law permit. Or isn’t there?
Perhaps the fact that constitutional rights are not just moral rights, but institutionalised
moral rights, makes a diﬀerence. Perhaps the whole point of institutionalising our
especially important moral rights is not just to codify them, but to give them enhanced
recognition and protection – more protection than they actually, morally speaking, call
for. For we need to guard against oﬃcial decision-makers’ overreach and abuse, and the
errors that they night make in the process of considering and balancing competing
values. On this view, we have good reasons to relieve judges from some of the hard
moral issues that deciding rights cases involves, for too much is at stake in the event
that they erroneously under-protect rights. If it is true that others (or society) are poor
judges of the value that particular options, activities, occupations, or courses of action
have for a right-holder,42 then the right-holder’s constitutional rights, as the institutiona-
lised counterparts of her important moral rights, perhaps need to be more generous than
the latter. Perhaps they need to be biased towards the right-holder’s self-interest – the
maximisation of her utility, as she herself sees it and deﬁnes it – and against her well-
being, for we cannot trust decision-makers to correctly work out what the latter means.
On this view, even if an aspect of my well-being is not important enough to morally
require the State to abstain from interfering with it in a particular way, or to take a
certain action to promote it, it may be constitutionally appropriate, in light of the risks
of under-protecting it, to artiﬁcially inﬂate its importance, and treat it as if it does
ground those duties.43 But if constitutional rights, as institutionalised moral rights,
41Kumm (n 3) 574, 593.
42John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Walter Scott Publishing 1989) 143–44.
43Compare Denise Meyerson, ‘Why Courts Should Not Balance Rights Against the Public Interest’ (2007) 31 Melbourne Uni-
versity L Rev 873.
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protect more than their un-institutionalised counterpart (so that they really do require the
realisation of their objects to the greatest extent possible given legal and factual possibili-
ties), it seems likely that this is so only in a circumscribed set of cases: those involving coer-
cive interference in the name of the right-holder’s own interest, or in the name of the
general interest44 (particularly, perhaps, when appeals to the general interest are relatively
amorphous, and likely to mask paternalistic interference). For reasons that I will explore in
the next section, the idea that constitutional rights require their objects’ optimisation is
often unhelpful in cases where the reason for restricting a constitutional right is
someone else’s constitutional right. As I argue in this section, it is also implausible to
apply this idea to cases of interference in the name of either the right-holder’s own interest,
or the general interest:
(a) Where the purported State duties that the right grounds are positive, rather than being
negative duties of non-interference; and
(b) Where the State’s interference is not coercive in nature.
As to (a), since positive duties are generally quite burdensome, it is irrational to expect
that a decision-maker should hold the State bound by them just because the factual and
legal possibilities do not rule out doing so, when the decision-maker is not, in conscience,
convinced that the relevant right actually requires the imposition of such duties. As to (b),
non-coercive interference is much less concerning than its coercive counterpart. If the idea
is that we should err on the side of not interfering with an option that the right-holder may
(for reasons we fail to appreciate) care very much about, the methods and outcomes of the
interference seem to matter a great deal.45 The disfavour for coercion (say, being seized by
the police) has to do (at least in part) with the immediacy and success (at least temporary)
with which it removes the option whose utility to the individual the State fails to appreci-
ate. Non-coercive interference – say educational measures, or failure to ﬁnancially sponsor
my option on a par with other options – is unlike coercive interference in these respects.
In sum: if it is at all plausible to overprotect constitutional rights by treating them like
optimisation requirements, it seems more so in cases of coercive interference in the name
of paternalism or the general interest. I want to conclude this section by casting doubt,
however, on the strength of these reasons based on risk-aversion even in these circum-
scribed cases (to reiterate, the risk to be averted here is that of decision-makers’ discount-
ing the value of the right’s object to the right-holder). I will argue that adopting the
optimisation view in such cases may well obscure the role diﬀerent constitutional rights
should have in managing the relationship between individual freedom and coercive
State action.
Suppose we must decide on the constitutionality of laws criminalising animal sacriﬁce
in religious rituals. Suppose we are concerned with their constitutionality insofar as they
apply even to instances of quick killing of an animal, and suppose we agree that animals do
not have rights. From an optimisation perspective, the logical way to proceed is to start by
44See ibid.
45Think of anti-smoking educational campaigns. These, unlike coercion, have no guaranteed outcomes. Those to whom
smoking continues to bring suﬃcient utility (as they themselves see it) will continue to smoke; if the others give up
the habit, then it is because their own appreciation of the utility they derive from smoking will have altered as a
result of the campaign.
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treating these instances as falling under the ambit of the relevant right46 (freedom of reli-
gion), and then consider whether the legal (and factual) possibilities enable us to say that
they are constitutionally protected, and that their criminalisation is unacceptable. This
approach, however, carries with it a rather crude framework of analysis. It is not condu-
cive, speciﬁcally, to making the argument that people may not have a religious freedom-
based right to do these things even if their criminalisation may well be unconstitutional.
Abandoning the view that constitutionally protected goods such as religious freedom
need to be realised to the greatest extent possible given relevant possibilities enables
decision-makers (and the rest of us) to make more nuanced judgements about what gen-
uinely contributes to human well-being and what does not. It may lead us to realise that
what is really objectionable in the criminalisation of these instances of ritual killing of
animals is the criminal nature of the interference, rather than the fact of interference
itself. We might conclude that the reason why the relevant laws are unconstitutional is
not that they interfere with a purported religious right to sacriﬁce animals, but that
they violate the right-holders’ right not to be subjected to the inhuman and degrading
treatment inﬂicted by coercive interference in the absence of harm to other rights-
bearing subjects. As Raz explains, in the absence of such harm, coercion used as a
means of removing morally unacceptable options is unjustiﬁable because it symbolically
demeans the person coerced upon, as well as indiscriminately interfering with her other
options too – including the acceptable ones. And even in the presence of harm, coercion
may be unjustiﬁable if the harm it inﬂicts exceeds that which it averts.47
There is a diﬀerence between concluding that concerns about the general interest are
not suﬃcient to justify coercive removal of the right to perform quick ritual killing (a con-
clusion that might well obtain under the optimisation view, insofar as it requires freedom
of religion to be realised to the greatest extent possible), and concluding that my right not
to be subjected to degrading treatment makes it unconstitutional for the State coercively to
remove that option from me, even if the right to religious freedom does not cover it. If the
optimisation view on rights is not conducive to drawing such distinctions, it seems that it
does not properly assist our practical reasoning in thinking well about rights. But remem-
ber that our reason for endorsing the optimisation view in cases of coercive interference
was precisely scepticism about decision-makers’ ability to think well about rights. Even
if that scepticism is justiﬁed, it looks like the touted remedy – the optimisation view –
may compound the problem of poor decision-making, rather than resolve it.
Conﬂicts of rights
Whether or not the idea of treating constitutional rights like optimisation requirements is
plausible in the circumscribed cases described above, it may obfuscate hopelessly the task
of decision-making in conﬂicts between opposing constitutional rights. Suppose X and Y
are conﬂicting moral rights, and constitutional rights [X] and [Y] their institutionalised
counterpart. X is the right to free speech, including the right to make allegations that
damage others’ reputation; and Y is the right to one’s reputation, grounded, say, in a
46A necessary consequence of Alexy’s principles theory of rights is ‘a wide conception of the scope of constitutional rights’.
Rivers (n 2) xvii, xxix.
47Raz (n 24) 412–20.
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broader right to private life. Now suppose that the truth of one’s defamatory allegations
correctly sets, morally speaking, the boundary between X and Y for people in the public
eye. Y, that is, grounds the moral duty of X-holders to refrain from making defamatory
allegations unless they are true. X grounds the moral duty of Courts and other State
agencies not to suppress or punish defamatory allegations when they are true. X and Y,
here, are in equilibrium. Now suppose that, in a relatively new constitutional system
(with limited precedents and contested interpretive conventions), the legal possibilities
are consistent with any of these outcomes: (a) People in the public eye forego [Y]; (b)
[X] includes no right to make defamatory allegations about anyone at all, regardless of
their truth; and (c) The truth of one’s defamatory allegations sets the boundary between
[X] and [Y] for people in the public eye. If, as the optimisation view tells us, both [X]
and [Y] require their realisation to the greatest extent possible, beyond the duties
morally justiﬁed, respectively, by X and Y, these duties will no longer oﬀer guidance on
how to reach an equilibrium between the rights. Decision-makers will be facing two conﬂ-
icting (optimisation) requirements, and ﬁnd it logically impossible to resolve the conﬂict.
The Law of Balancing and the Weight Formula can be used to resolve the conﬂict in
favour of (c), but remember that they belong to proportionality analysis, which, pace
Alexy’s co-implication claim, is logically inconsistent with conceptualising rights as
optimisation requirements. Proportionality postulates that a correct balance between
rights can be found precisely because (on the understanding ascribed to it in this
paper) it assumes that neither right extends (even potentially) any further than it
morally should. Conversely, optimisation, requiring maximisation of a right’s object
subject only to factual and legal possibilities (which, as a matter of contingent social
fact, may permit more than the morally required), licenses outcomes in which consti-
tutional rights are overprotected relative to the moral rights they institutionalise (as
long as overprotection does not fall afoul of Radbruch-style unconscionability).48
Structural discretion
I have argued above that there is a mismatch between the logic of optimisation and the
logic of proportionality. One implication of this is that even assuming (as I do in this
paper) that the proportionality limb in Alexy’s theory facilitates rights determinations
in accordance with sound morality, proportionality cannot function simply as a qualiﬁca-
tion or corrective to the optimisation limb. Optimisation has its own distinctive logic (fol-
lowing from how it is articulated in the deﬁnition of rights as optimisation requirements);
because of this, even when wedded to proportionality analysis (the Law of Balancing, the
Weight Formula, the Law of Conﬂicting Principles, etc), it continues to interfere with such
analysis, distorting a sound assessment of the interests at stake. This is particularly appar-
ent in cases of so-called structural discretion.
When Courts defer to Parliament’s discretion, they often mention Parliament’s
superior expertise on particular matters, or its democratic legitimacy to resolve socially
controversial problems. In these cases, the assumption is that there is one resolution to
48In the free speech v reputation case discussed in this section, while it is clear to me that (a) and (b) are inferior to (c), it is
unclear that settling on either of them would be patently unconscionable. In other words, the unconscionability con-
straint built into the concept of ‘legal possibilities’ does not seem to rule out (a) and (b), which means that we can rea-
listically envisage the scenario in this example.
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the problem that is the correct one – Parliament being better placed to ﬁnd it. These are
cases of epistemic discretion – whether factual or normative – whose existence Alexy’s
theory readily acknowledges.49 But deference can also be used as a method of dispute res-
olution in situations in which practical reason indicates that the values at stake do not
require one uniquely correct outcome.
Suppose I have a right to same-sex relationship recognition (grounded in my more
general right to family life), and that I live in a society in which relationship rights
follow the performance of either religious or civil ceremonies of the appropriate kind. If
I have such a right under these circumstances, I must have access to at least some of
these ceremonies, which means that someone is under a duty to perform such a ceremony
for me if I meet the eligibility requirements. Let us assume that the right to freedom of
religion rules out forcing religious organisations to perform the ceremony. Now
suppose that a public oﬃcial who happens to be religious refuses to oﬃciate at my civil
ceremony, in a context in which another oﬃcial is available to oﬃciate. Morally speaking,
under these circumstances there may be no uniquely correct option between the relevant
public authority requiring its religiously-minded oﬃcial to oﬃciate at my ceremony in
their civil capacity (under pain of being dismissed), and permitting them to decline on
conscientious objection grounds. Assume that either option is equally consistent with
both factual and legal possibilities. A judge asked to resolve this conﬂict of rights could
legitimately defer to the course of action chosen by the public authority.
Alexy recognises these scenarios. He calls them instances of ‘structural’, or ‘substantial’,
or ‘substantive’ discretion, arguing that they are not problematic: ‘That the legislature [or,
by extension, a public body] is free where no obligations exist is not in need of justiﬁca-
tion’.50 The distinction drawn by Alexy between epistemic and structural discretion has
become commonplace.51 Yet, ultimately that distinction collapses, for there are parts of
Alexy’s argument that tend to reduce structural discretion to epistemic discretion. Speciﬁ-
cally, Alexy argues that (the most important kind of) structural discretion arises because,
in the process of balancing, our judgments cannot be sensitive enough to accurately gauge
the relative importance of competing values and the seriousness of interferences with
them.52 Only a relatively crude assessment is possible, because of ‘the limits of ordinary
language’,53 which we use to express (and which, hence, shapes) these judgements. This
seems to assume that, if only our categories of language/thought were reﬁned enough,
we would be able to grasp the real moral signiﬁcance of the alternative outcomes and
be able properly to adjudicate between them. It is almost as if Alexy is saying that struc-
tural discretion is something of a second best scenario, forced on us by the limits of our
49Alexy (n 1) 414–21. See also Matthias Klatt and Johannes Schmidt, ‘Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional Law’ (2012) 10
ICON 69.
50Robert Alexy, ‘Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics’ (2014) 12 ICON 511, section 6.
51See e.g. Matthias Klatt and Mortiz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (OUP 2012) 75–84; Matthias Klatt,
‘Taking Rights Less Seriously: A Structural Analysis of Judicial Discretion’ (2007) 20 Ratio Juris 506; Julian Rivers, ‘Propor-
tionality and Discretion in International and European Law’ in Nicholas Tsagourias (ed), Transational Constitutionalism:
European and International Perspectives (CUP 2007) 107. Sieckmann speaks of structural and epistemic ‘indeterminacy’,
to which he adds a ‘discursive’ type of indeterminacy, which describes situations in which diﬀerent agents or
decision-makers reasonably disagree on the correct outcome, rather than recognising that more than one outcome is
optimal. Jan R Sieckmann, ‘The Logic of Autonomy: Law, Morality and Autonomous Reasoning’ (Hart 2012) 102–04.
52Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Review’ Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Nove de Lisboa <https://
fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/jsb_ma_16920.doxc> accessed 28 Septrmber 2018.
53Kum (n 3) 574, 581.
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cognition of the world – while in an ideal world we would always be able to come up with
one uniquely correct answer. Klatt reinforces this view, speaking of discretion as ‘a univer-
sal and unavoidable problem’ (emphasis added).54
This is puzzling. After all, morality is best understood as immanent in our human prac-
tices,55 and if we conscientiously come to the conclusion that the values at stake justify a
range of equally acceptable options, why mistrust our practical reason? Our exercise of
practical reason is of course always fallible; but why assume that there must be shortcom-
ings (however unavoidable) only when we reach the conclusion that more than one option
is acceptable under the circumstances, and not when we reach a clear-cut conclusion?56
Why view situations of multiple morally permissible alternative options as somehow
out of the ordinary in law, when they frequently occur in everyday life?
I think these diﬃculties in thinking well about structural discretion stem from the very
starting point of the theory that rights are optimisation requirements, bearing out my
point that a commitment to optimisation distorts a proper understanding of proportion-
ality and balancing. According to Klatt, Alexy recognises that in cases of structural discre-
tion ‘the law neither commands nor prohibits following either of the two conﬂicting
principles’.57 This means that the law – that is, the balancing exercise that determines
the legal possibilities – permits that either be followed. Yet, logically speaking, permission
cannot be the result of two colliding optimisation requirements.
Alexy intuits this where, in discussing structural discretion, he speaks of a ‘stalemate’ in
balancing competing principles,58 which, according to him, means that the principles have
the same ‘concrete weight’.59 No wonder that, under this view, structural discretion
becomes a problem and a failure of practical reason: for giving eﬀect to one principle
(maximising its object given relevant possibilities) means frustrating the other without
proper justiﬁcation (that is, without a weightier counter-consideration than the defeated
principle). It is like randomly awarding a prize to a contestant when the match was a
draw. This is of course very unsatisfactory. Unsurprisingly, having conceptualised struc-
tural discretion as a stalemate, Alexy and his followers feel that something has gone
wrong, that if only it were possible to reﬁne the scales, we could truly decide which prin-
ciple should prevail.
But the real problem is with the theory that tries to account for our use of practical
reason in these instances, rather than with the use of practical reason itself. For the
impression that there is stalemate is just that, an impression, and an artefact of the way
in which the optimisation theory wrongly conceives of rights. In reality, in cases of struc-
tural discretion there is no stalemate; nothing regrettable has happened at all. It is simply a
case where the purported duties grounded in the supposedly conﬂicting rights do not exist
(that is, are not justiﬁed by the relevant rights), so that there are no clashing requirements
in the ﬁrst place. In the example I used above, although I have a right to family life, and the
oﬃcial a right to religious freedom, neither requires the realisation of their object to the
54Klatt (n 51) 506.
55Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law’ (1993) 107 Harvard Law Review 714,
740.
56The answer is probably law’s bias towards an ethos of singularity. See Margaret Davies, ‘The Ethos of Pluralism’ (2005) 27
Sydney L Rev 87.
57Klatt (n 51) 506, 519.
58Alexy (n 1) 394–95.
59Klatt (n 51) 506, 519.
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greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. In particular, my right to
family life does not ground a duty in the public authority to guarantee that a speciﬁc cele-
brant oﬃciate at my ceremony; and the oﬃcial’s right to religious freedom does not
ground the authority’s duty to refrain from disciplining them through dismissal if they
refuse oﬃciating. Simply, neither right is important enough to ground those duties.
Nor do the conﬂicting rights have to have the same ‘concrete weight’ in order for us to
reach these conclusions. It is enough that they do not have suﬃcient weight to ground the
relevant duties. It may be, for example, that the interest in religious freedom is never
important enough to justify civil servants’ declining to perform their oﬃcial duties (when-
ever these are morally permissible), because, say, of considerations about the authority’s
eﬃciency in delivering services, combined with considerations about not fostering divi-
siveness in the workplace. Employers are, thus, under no duty not to dismiss those who
do decline; though neither are they obliged to dismiss them. On the other hand, the
right to family life, because of organisational reasons, may not be important enough to
ground a right to access relationship recognition via the oﬃces of a particular public
oﬃcial (as long as another is at the ready), whatever the reasons for their failure to
oﬃciate (be it religiously-inspired homophobia, or the need for a toilet break). In such
a situation, public authorities are under no duty to dismiss the nonperforming employee,
though they may choose to do so, in order to pursue legitimate interests (avoiding divisive-
ness; fostering eﬃciency; supporting a non-homophobic culture). But here the interests in
freedom of religion and in family life need not be of equal concrete weight, and there need
not be a stalemate between them. They just need to be, in the circumstances, not important
enough to ground the relevant duties.
We can only properly understand cases of structural discretion if we take consti-
tutional rights to extend just as far as they need to and no further, given relevant
moral considerations, as well as legal and factual possibilities. Depending on the
outcome (and we are assuming either outcome is equally defensible) either family
life or religious freedom will have been realised more than was required by the right
that protected them (though no more than was morally acceptable). Perhaps, in light
of the legal and factual possibilities, we will even conclude that it was realised to the
greatest extent possible. But if that is so, it was not the corresponding right that required
that optimising outcome; it was the relevant interest that justiﬁed the outcome without
requiring it.
Conclusions
Constitutional rights are not optimisation requirements because the moral rights that con-
stitutional rights institutionalise are not optimisation requirements.
The reason why moral rights are not optimisation requirements is their connection to
human well-being. Understanding human well-being means, among other things, appre-
ciating the diﬀerence between duties grounded in justice and supererogatory actions (a
distinction ﬂattened by the optimisation view), and discriminating between that which
contributes to well-being and that which does not (a task the optimisation view is not con-
ducive to). Moral rights do not require their objects to be realised to the greatest extent
possible given relevant possibilities, but for their objects to be realised no less and no
more than relevant moral considerations require. This is tautological, but tautologies
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are true. An optimisation perspective on moral rights obscures this tautology by, among
other things, conﬂating the morally possible with the morally required.
If we take the possibility of legitimate authority seriously, our understanding of consti-
tutional rights must allow that they be capable of correctly channelling moral require-
ments into constitutional law. Unfortunately, depending on what the legal possibilities
contingently happen to be in any one legal system, the optimisation view may instruct
that system’s decision-makers to realise the object of a constitutional right over and
beyond what the corresponding moral right requires, over and beyond what supereroga-
tory considerations recommend, and over and beyond what justice permits (as long as
Radbruch-style unconscionability is not reached).
The fact of institutionalisation perhaps justiﬁes some divergence between the structure
of constitutional rights and the moral rights they institutionalise. But any such divergence
should be capable of being properly accounted for, and it should not result in making non-
sense of constitutional rights. I have argued that only when paternalistic coercive interfer-
ence (or interference that can be assimilated to it) is at issue, may there be an advantage in
treating constitutional rights like optimisation requirements. In these cases, overprotecting
the objects of rights may be a way of warding oﬀ the risk of under-protecting them. But I
am not sure the case is clear-cut even here. It seems that in these cases, as in all others, the
optimisation view ultimately does not assist us in thinking well about rights. It is particu-
larly inept at making sense, and guide decision-making in the context, of conﬂicts of rights,
including conﬂicts which legally and morally admit of more than one correct solution.
A better view than the optimisation view holds that constitutional rights demand that
their objects be realised – within the factual and legal possibilities – no more and no less
than morally required by the interests in which rights are grounded. This is the under-
standing on which any sensible method of resolution of conﬂicts involving rights must
be premised. Indeed, I think this (and not a conceptualisation of rights as optimisation
principles) is the understanding of rights tacitly informing the proportionality limb in
Alexy’s own theory.
Alexy says that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between principles and rules because,
unlike the former, which demand optimisation, ‘if a rule is valid, it requires that one do
exactly what it demands, nothing more and nothing less’.60 But this is as true of consti-
tutional rights (understood as principles) as it is of rules.61 Rights that take the form of
statements of principle may require more work than rules generally do to work out
what they demand; but, like rules, they demand compliance with whatever they
demand – whether or not what they demand is antecedently clear – not with some pur-
ported imperative to realise their object to the greatest extent possible.
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